Splitting commands, balancing missions: DefenseScoop’s Mark Pomerleau on the tug-of-war over cyber intelligence and operations

In a wide-ranging conversation on the McCrary Institute’s Cyber Focus podcast, DefenseScoop reporter Mark Pomerleau unpacked the evolving structure, doctrine and operational tensions shaping U.S. cyber operations across the Department of Defense. From the long-running debate over splitting the leadership of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command to the growing demand for tactical cyber capabilities on the battlefield, Pomerleau described a defense ecosystem working to align intelligence and military missions in cyberspace.

“There’s always a desire to not disrupt [intelligence] collection,” he said, referring to the longstanding Title 10 vs. Title 50 “intel gain/loss” debate. Cyber Command, operating under Title 10 military authorities, often relies on infrastructure built for Title 50 intelligence missions – creating friction when offensive operations risk exposing sensitive sources and methods. As Pomerleau noted, “Using that same infrastructure for military operations … can undermine that [intelligence] mission.”

That core tension is once again in the spotlight amid renewed discussion of formally separating NSA and Cyber Command leadership. While the original dual-hat arrangement was designed to give USCYBERCOM a jump start, incoming Trump administration officials have reignited speculation that a structural decoupling may be imminent. “Some believe the relationship with NSA has limited the command too much,” Pomerleau said, adding that the Title 10 side of the house increasingly wants more freedom to act – especially below the threshold of armed conflict.

Still, unwinding the arrangement wouldn’t be easy. Proponents of the dual-hat model argue that shared leadership has enabled real-time coordination and improved strategic awareness. “You have a person at the top that can call balls and strikes on either side,” Pomerleau explained. A split would introduce new seams – and likely push decision-making to higher levels of government.

Beyond the leadership debate, Pomerleau pointed to broader doctrinal shifts underway. Military services are experimenting with “expeditionary cyber” concepts, blending cyber and electronic warfare effects to support frontline commanders. The Army has merged its cyber and EW branches, while the Air Force and Navy are rolling out new non-kinetic operations units. These developments, he said, reflect the reality that cyber operations are no longer confined to strategic networks – they’re becoming integral to tactical maneuvers and mission execution.

Pomerleau also highlighted the emergence of a conceptual “modern triad” that brings together cyber, space and special operations capabilities. While still taking shape, the idea is gaining traction as the services and combatant commands begin exploring how these domains can support integrated mission packages. Like the Cold War’s nuclear triad, the goal is to combine distinct domains into a force greater than the sum of its parts. “It’s not a one-off,” he said. “I think it’s going to be sustained.”

When it comes to cyber deterrence, however, questions remain. Despite more aggressive rhetoric from senior leaders, Pomerleau expressed skepticism that adversaries feel constrained by the current U.S. posture. “You’re never going to deter espionage activity,” he said. “But if there’s a way to create more friction and make it harder for them to do their job, they might think twice about it.”

As the Defense Department moves forward with “CYBERCOM 2.0” and expands the Cyber Mission Force, key decisions around doctrine, structure and operational control remain unsettled. As one of the leading journalists covering U.S. cyber strategy, Pomerleau offers a rare window into how internal debates are shaping the future of American cyber power. For a deeper dive into how the Pentagon is navigating the friction between intelligence and military operations, listen to the full conversation on Cyber Focus.