The short-war illusion: What Iran teaches Beijing about Taiwan

In a military conflict with Taiwan, China’s cheapest path to victory is a short, decisive one: a decapitating opening strike—that is, a strike targeting leadership—that collapses organized resistance and a rapid seizure of the island, handing Washington a fait accompli.

Two recent wars test that bet. Russia’s attempt in 2022 to decapitate Kyiv and force a quick capitulation fell apart within days. The U.S. and Israeli war with Iran in 2026 offers the same verdict. Decapitation strikes did not end the war, the denial of a key chokepoint proved cheap to impose and costly to break, and protraction favored the dispersed defender. None of this should let Taiwan rest easy—Iran spent decades preparing for exactly this kind of war.

This piece views the conflict through the lens the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) itself might use—the essential audience whose response Washington and Taipei must anticipate as they design their own defenses. Beijing performs this same exercise in earnest: Having not fought a war since 1979, the PLA studies other states’ wars precisely to learn lessons for modern warfare.

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