Food and ag sector ‘will almost certainly be more intensely targeted’ by attacks

The food and agriculture sector as well as supporting agencies need adequate resources and training to be prepared for attacks that would have a devastating impact on the nation’s food supply, experts told the House Homeland Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology on Tuesday.

“Agroterrorists who use biological agents and other means to disrupt our food supply chain can find success in generating mass fear, instability and economic damage,” said Chairman Dale Strong (R-Ala.). “This makes our agriculture a tempting target for hostile actors.”

As agricultural operators continue to incorporate better technology to improve efficiency, the attack surface broadens and becomes “more vulnerable to cyberattacks, potentially jeopardizing the entire supply chain,” Strong noted.

Cris Young, a professor at Auburn University’s College of Veterinary Medicine and former USDA program director, told lawmakers in prepared remarks that “non-state actors like terrorist and violent extremist organizations may also target our homeland food supply via the agriculture sector.”

“I am especially concerned about this during gray-zone conflict,” added the retired Army colonel.

The goal would be to disrupt critical food and water supplies “followed by tactical and strategic dominance, and eventual destruction,” and both the food supply and supporting infrastructure “will almost certainly be more intensely targeted in the future,” Young testified.

“Attacks are likely to be geographically diffused, staggered over time and be combined with cognitive warfare elements, the specifics of which are more suitable for a classified forum,” he continued. “Because of this threat landscape, it is critical that the U.S. government better prepare for and mitigate threats to our agriculture sector.”

Daniel Wims, president of Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University, told lawmakers in prepared testimony that “an additional threat is the increase in foreign investment in our nation’s agricultural land from countries such as China.”

“Defending access to American abundance and preserving the American experiment is the essence of agrosecurity, and it is why farm security is national security,” Wims said.

Marty Vanier, director of the National Agricultural Biosecurity Center at Kansas State University and the associate director of the Biosecurity Research Institute at Kansas State University, told the subcommittee that regardless of agroterrorists’ goals to inflict economic disaster or affect military preparedness they “have the parallel effect of creating fear and a lack of trust in the food supply chain and the government’s ability to protect the safety of the American food supply.”

“The interconnectedness of the production of food crops and animals will have wide-reaching impacts,” she said in prepared remarks. “Think trucking, ag banking, fuel and fertilizer, equipment manufacturing, sales and repairs, feedstuffs, medications, harvest activities, employment, and all of the economic multiplier effects on rural communities.”

Cyber threats can target precision agriculture or control systems, or spread disinformation that could be “catastrophic” on the ag industry. Research security is also a concern.

Vanier warned that there “are not enough people working in the animal disease world to manage an outbreak” of a foreign animal disease, and first responders who may not be familiar with this type of emergency response would be called in to help. “In the event of a true nefarious event law enforcement will naturally be involved,” she said, calling for robust resources and training to support communities.

Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense executive director Asha George emphasized that “a single animal or plant pathogen – introduced intentionally or spread naturally – could have devastating consequences for multiple industries in this critical infrastructure sector.”

“We have all witnessed how highly pathogenic avian influenza can devastate not just poultry producers but also dairy farms, raising the price of eggs and dairy products for all consumers. And those are the effects of a virus we are relatively familiar with and for which we have developed or are developing countermeasures,” George told lawmakers in prepared remarks. “Other threats loom on the horizon and could inflict event greater damage on American farming and associated industries.”

Estimates “suggest that the arrival of African Swine Fever in the United States could cause $15 billion in losses for the domestic pork industry in just the first two years after introduction alone, and potentially as much as $50 billion in the long term,” George continued. “Wheat blast could have catastrophic consequences for the Nation’s wheat supply. Both of these diseases, and many others, are already present in the Western Hemisphere, increasing the chances that the United States will eventually have to determine how best to respond to, recover from, and mitigate their impacts.”

Despite the potential impacts to the sector, “biodefense activities that support animal and plant health have historically lagged behind those for human health,” she said.

Stressing that securing the food supply should take into account the broader picture of biodefense, George said that adversaries “can see for themselves the disruption that highly pathogenic avian influenza has caused within the United States” at a time when “technology has made it easier to weaponize biological agents.”

“Defending the nation against biological threats that affect national security is not, and has never been, a top priority for any of the 15 cabinet departments, nine independent agencies, and one independent institution (the Smithsonian) that possess responsibilities for biodefense,” she added. “Biodefense has always been disgracefully, woefully and incomprehensively underfunded.”