Securing America’s ports: Hidden maritime security threats from foreign-owned and operated technology

America’s ports are a backbone of the U.S. economy and national defense. They move food, fuel, medical supplies, and military logistics at scale. But modern port operations increasingly depend on networked industrial systems, especially ship-to-shore (STS) cranes, where the line between “equipment” and “information technology” has largely disappeared.

A central concern is the dominance of Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned enterprise (SOE), which controls around 80% of STS cranes operating at U.S. ports. Market dominance at this level is not just a commercial reality; it hardwires a structural supply chain and transport sector dependency on the PRC, creating a national security risk that can be rapidly exploited in a geopolitical crisis.

Foreign-manufactured equipment can introduce vulnerabilities through unauthorized modifications and installations, such as cellular modems added to cranes, creating backdoor pathways that can be exploited for espionage or sabotage. These risks are compounded by recurring weaknesses in maritime operational technology (OT) environments: end-of-life operating systems that are unpatched, weak password policies, and broad use of privileged accounts. In critical infrastructure, such conditions turn routine connectivity into an attack surface.

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