Critical undersea infrastructures: A framework to address threats in a post-physical context

In 2025, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Red Sea were sabotaged or meddled with, disrupting global connectivity. Despite NATO warnings and coast guard interceptions, the international community remains largely powerless to deter these “gray zone” attacks beneath the waves.

Undersea cables are a key component of Critical Maritime Infrastructure (CMI), which also encompasses other vital assets such as pipelines, energy interconnectors, offshore oil platforms, wind farms, ports, and cable landing points. While societal dependence on the free and continuous flow of digital data has increased tremendously, so have vulnerabilities and adversarial behaviors. This is expected to intensify over the coming decades due to escalating geopolitical tensions and new technologies, such as autonomous underwater systems and cyber-offensive capabilities. These technologies introduce new attack vectors and provide malign actors with asymmetric, low-cost tools to interfere with CMI.

Anticipated developments include a rise in cyber-attacks, efforts to intercept data transmissions for future decryption via quantum computing, and targeted attacks on cable landing stations (the weakest points in maritime infrastructure). Additionally, sabotage attempts by non-state actors against submarine cables are likely to become more prevalent. For example, the Houthis have demonstrated an understanding of the strategic advantage gained by destabilizing maritime systems. The convergence of these threats, alongside the fragility of other critical infrastructures (e.g., satellites and energy grids), may significantly undermine future digital resilience and sovereignty. Current models of deterrence and governance are structurally inadequate to protect undersea infrastructure, requiring a shift from state-centric to multi-stakeholder, “post-physical” resilience.

Read more at Georgetown Journal of International Affairs