Creating conspiracy theories: What information warriors need to know

During the Algerian War of Independence, French counterinsurgency forces exploited a psychological vulnerability within the ranks of the National Liberation Front (FLN) by creating a conspiracy theory. Through a deception operation known as La Bleuite, the French generated the fear of betrayal and increased risk amongst the Algerian revolutionaries. The conspiracy held that French intelligence had deeply infiltrated the FLN movement. Suspicion  spread through the ranks, causing trust and cohesion to collapse in some cases. The perceived threat was existential. If traitors were everywhere, the movement’s identity and moral authority were at risk. This resulted in purging of the ranks in an effort to sift out traitors. Many otherwise loyal revolutionaries were persecuted and murdered. This weakened the FLN more effectively than direct military action. It succeeded because it leveraged existing fears, redefined uncertainty as hostile intent, and imposed social and operational costs on disbelief.  

For information warriors, the lesson is that conspiracy theories can be weaponized as an information weapon if properly constructed. They emerge when uncertainty is left unresolved, and uncertainty is pervasive in war. Understanding this matters because conspiracy theories can condition how people interpret events before any visible action takes place. They shape what feels plausible. They determine which sources are trusted and which are dismissed. They define enemies in advance and assign moral blame before facts are known. By the time violence, protest or mobilization occurs, the interpretive work has already been created. Actions then feel defensive rather than aggressive. Decisions feel necessary rather than chosen. For information warriors, this means influence is often decided upstream, at the level of belief formation, not at the moment of crisis.  

This essay does not offer tactical guidance on deploying conspiracy narratives; instead, it explains how such belief systems function, why they are effective and what risks they pose when treated as tools of influence in modern conflict. However, it does offer practitioners guidelines for taking direct action. For example, conspiracy theories are not injected into audiences at moments of decision. They are cultivated in advance by shaping how threat, trust, and identity are interpreted over time. This requires keen attention to the operational environment and the existing vulnerabilities ripe for exploitation. Effective influence operates upstream, before claims are stabilized and before sides are fixed. To explain how this works, the discussion now turns to two complementary theoretical frameworks about conspiracy theories. First is the existential threat model (ETM), and second is what can be referred to as the conspiracy belief formation model. Taken together, they show how conspiracy theories can be deliberately cultivated without relying on spectacle, mass deception, or centralized propaganda. 

Read more at Small Wars Journal