China’s expanding global intelligence footprint In the digital age

(State Department photo)

By Tahir Azad • Mar 09, 2026

Espionage is not an unusual affair in international politics; it is one of the system’s most common habits. Since strategic surprises are expensive and uncertainty is dangerous, states have always tried to find out what their competitors are planning, what technologies they have, what their goals are, and how can they respond. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union all built robust intelligence enterprises in the 20^th century that included human sources, signals intelligence, and covert action programs. Espionage has not gone away in the 21^st century; instead, with the help of technology, it has gotten bigger, faster and more powerful. The methods changed in the intelligence competition, and so did the major players.

China has become a rising power with global ambitions, and its intelligence apparatus abroad reflects this ambition. For some observers, China is “spying everywhere”; for others, it is acting like any other major power, but with unique advantages stemming from its industrial capacity, digital ecosystems and extensive state-market coordination. Understanding the scope and logic of China’s expanding intelligence footprint is essential for policymakers, businesses, and researchers navigating an era where technology and security are deeply intertwined. This article aims to clarify how China’s intelligence model operates, why it matters for global power competition, and what its rise means for the balance of international strategic influence.

China’s global intelligence footprint blends traditional human intelligence with offensive cyber operations and large-scale data collection, alongside the strategic use of technological and commercial dependencies. Campaigns such as Salt Typhoon illustrate how state-linked actors have targeted telecommunications and critical infrastructure networks to obtain sensitive information and strategic access. Western security agencies frequently warn that Chinese intelligence services and state-linked actors target sensitive information and intellectual property across government, industry and academia. In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice charged members of the China-linked APT10 group with conducting a global cyber-espionage campaign against managed service providers to steal commercial and technological data from multiple countries. In the United Kingdom, parliamentary and intelligence reporting has repeatedly highlighted concerns about large-scale Chinese espionage and influence activities across government, industry, and academia. A recent House of Commons Library briefing summarises warnings from MI5 and other agencies that China-linked actors target sensitive technologies, universities and political institutions, while MI5 Director-General Ken McCallum has publicly described Chinese intelligence activity as a “game-changing” strategic challenge affecting multiple public and private sectors. Parliamentary oversight bodies have similarly noted risks to research institutions and advanced technology industries, underscoring the breadth of concern across the UK national security community. In October 2023, Five Eyes intelligence chiefs publicly warned about widespread Chinese espionage targeting critical infrastructure sectors. U.S. and allied authorities have sanctioned individuals associated with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) for global hacking operations targeting intellectual property and government data, while coordinated advisories from the U.S., UK, and European states have reinforced these warnings.