Why many underestimated Russia’s invasion risk

Why did so many downplay the risk of a Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 despite mounting indicators, such as troop build-ups, major exercises, and increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Moscow?

Even hours before the first strikes, major media outlets argued that an invasion was unlikely, as it seemed to contradict President Vladimir Putin’s cost-benefit calculus. They assumed he would conclude that the costs of heavy Western sanctions, together with the risk of significant battlefield casualties, outweighed the potential gains.

Many analysts and observers underestimated the likelihood of invasion in part because they modeled Russia as a typical state in which checks from domestic elites significantly constrain the leader. Most states, whether democratic or authoritarian, have internal power structures that force leaders to constantly bargain with a coalition of insiders to stay in office and secure cooperation to execute policy. However, by February 2022, Putin had been in control — either directly by holding office or indirectly, during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency — for more than two decades. In this time, he progressively purged, replaced, and remodeled elite groups, ensuring loyalist predominance while the institutional arrangements he established made elite dissent costly and coordination among dissident elites difficult. This cumulative process left Putin with enough political latitude to order a large-scale invasion that many outside observers thought a leader in his position could not politically afford to initiate. This was not the only driver of his decision — false optimism and his personal worldview also played a crucial role — but it was an important structural condition that many analysts underweighted.

Read more at War on the Rocks