The cyber wars that weren’t

At the onset of the Israel-Iran conflict, news websites warned the public of the possible collateral damage the Israel-Iran fight could generate in cyberspace. The ominous warnings about the hacktivists flocking to both sides of the conflict were remarkably similar to those issued at the onset during the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts. Yet, despite the participants of these conflicts standing as some of the most cyber-capable states in the world, activities in cyberspace failed to translate into a meaningful battlefield effect, drawing into question the military utility of offensive cyber operations. This article analyzes the use of offensive cyber operations across the Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, and Israel-Iran conflicts and outlines lessons learned for how offensive cyber operations can factor into future conflicts.

The onset of hostilities in all three conflicts included a flurry of cyber activity seemingly in tandem with attacks in the physical domain. Yet, there are meaningful differences regarding the nuanced timing of these cyberattacks that are indicative of two distinctly different offensive cyber strategies.

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia’s perpetual harassment of Ukraine in the virtual domain intensified with a wave of significant cyberattacks targeting Ukraine a full month prior to Russia’s kinetic attacks. This was followed by a second wave of significant cyberattacks in the 24 hours immediately preceding Russia’s multi-axis invasion of Ukraine.

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