The blind spots in Chinese military studies

During a recent conference on the People’s Liberation Army, I heard the same question posed to attendees and paper writers: “How would China react to U.S. force posture change X, Y, or Z?” or “How would the Chinese military respond to U.S. strikes in certain locations?” Having participated in dozens of unclassified wargames at the RAND Corporation and elsewhere, I hear a similar refrain when playing the “red team.”

This is a reasonable and legitimate question. Policymakers and war planners should understand likely Chinese responses in studying and preparing for possible contingencies between China and the United States.

To make well-grounded assessments of “red,” one should be deeply indoctrinated in Chinese methods of war rooted in doctrinal texts of the People’s Liberation Army. And those sources, at least at the unclassified level, are drying up. The authoritative primary and secondary source documents published by reputable academic institutions affiliated with the Chinese military are dwindling or becoming outdated in the face of the People’s Liberation Army organizational reforms. This creates a “blind spot” for academics and “blue” force planners attempting to simulate how China would react to a fast-evolving battlefield environment.

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