House Intel chairman urges offensive cyber push to counter China, cartels and infrastructure threats

In a wide-ranging interview on the Cyber Focus podcast, Rep. Rick Crawford (R-Ark.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, called for a more aggressive U.S. cyber posture to confront growing threats from nation-state adversaries and criminal cartels. “We are living in a state of digital warfare,” he said. “As long as we continue to be in a defensive posture, this will continue to be a pervasive problem.”

Crawford argued that U.S. Cyber Command needs broader authorities to conduct offensive cyber operations, describing many so-called “offensive” tactics as effectively defensive measures in a digital environment where adversaries already occupy U.S. networks. “We’ve got to wrestle with the authorities that give an entity like USCYBERCOM the ability to go on offense,” he said. “Our adversaries are in our networks, they’re in our systems, [and] are threatening critical infrastructure. Is there any reason why we shouldn’t do that?” He suggested that continuing to draw strict lines between defense and offense is a strategic liability – one foreign actors are actively exploiting.

The congressman also addressed the long-running debate over the “dual-hat” leadership structure that places both the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command under the same commander – a compromise arrangement originally intended as a temporary measure. Crawford argued that the current model no longer meets the demands of today’s threat landscape, describing it as a “half in, half out” approach that dilutes focus and accountability. “We either need to be all in as a combatant command … or we need to say the NSA can do this and make it a subsidiary,” he said, urging Congress and the Pentagon to resolve the issue. “The wrong [approach] is to not get it done.”

China’s access to operational technology and freight infrastructure raises alarm

Much of Crawford’s concern focused on China, particularly its penetration of U.S. supply chains and operational technology systems. He pointed to Chinese-manufactured port cranes, chassis and shipping containers as potential surveillance platforms embedded in American infrastructure. “Our industry needs to recognize there is a demand for secure, domestically manufactured hardware,” he said. Crawford warned that Beijing’s interest in this data goes far beyond commercial use. “They have the capability to monitor about 85% of freight rail movement across the world,” he said. “Where they’re lacking is the United States.”

He also highlighted an often-overlooked national security risk: agricultural technology. Citing a post-acquisition partnership between Bayer/Monsanto and Chinese tech giant Alibaba, Crawford warned that ag data has become a critical target. “It’s become now one of the most important commodities of agriculture production: the farmer’s data,” he said. He emphasized the need for tighter integration between the intelligence community and agencies such as the USDA to safeguard data and agricultural infrastructure against cyber and bioterrorism threats.

Crawford expressed frustration over gaps in domestic counterintelligence, especially within the context of an open society. “Our counterintelligence is probably the weakest here at home,” he said, noting that adversaries exploit the constitutional protections that limit U.S. surveillance powers domestically. He called for reforms across the federal law enforcement and intelligence enterprise, describing it as a priority in conversations with leadership at DOJ and DHS.

From information sharing to operational cyber collaboration

The congressman also advocated for moving beyond outdated public-private information sharing models, pushing instead for direct operational collaboration between government and the private sector. As host Frank Cilluffo noted, “Most companies did not go into business thinking they had to defend themselves against foreign militaries.” Crawford agreed: “But that’s not the case anymore.”

He pointed to a past pilot effort in Arkansas that brought intelligence officials together with business and university leaders to discuss threats, reporting protocols and industry-specific vulnerabilities. The strong response from local stakeholders, he said, showed the value of meeting industry where it is and offering tangible, sector-relevant briefings. “We were able to bring that IC right down to the grassroots level,” Crawford recalled.

With policy debates intensifying over liability protections, CISA reauthorization and the future of the NSA-USCYBERCOM structure, Crawford’s comments reflect a growing sense in Congress that piecemeal approaches won’t suffice. “These things are in our face, whether we like it or not,” he said. “And we have to start playing a more proactive role.”